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Future quantum information networks will consist of quantum and classical agents, who have the
ability to communicate in a variety of ways with trusted and untrusted parties and securely delegate
computational tasks to untrusted large-scale quantum computing servers. Multipartite quantum
entanglement is a fundamental resource for such a network and hence it is imperative to study the
possibility of verifying a multipartite entanglement source in a way that is efficient and provides
strong guarantees even in the presence of multiple dishonest parties. In this Letter, we show how an
agent of a quantum network can perform a distributed verification of a source creating multipartite
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states with minimal resources, which is, nevertheless, resistant
against any number of dishonest parties. Moreover, we provide a tight tradeoff between the level
of security and the distance between the state produced by the source and the ideal GHZ state.
Last, by adding the resource of a trusted common random source, we can further provide security
guarantees for all honest parties in the quantum network simultaneously.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
Entanglement plays a key role in the study and de-
velopment of quantum information theory. It has been
widely used in all aspects of quantum information and
has been essential to show the advantages obtained com-
pared to the classical setting. Initially defined for bipar-
tite states, the notion of entanglement has been general-
ized to multipartite systems and despite the complexity
this notion acquires in this case, many interesting prop-
erties of multipartite entangled states are known. If we
consider, for example, the quantum correlations of the
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [1] and its n-
party generalization, we can find a nonlocal game that
can be won with probability 1 in the quantum setting,
while any classical local theory can win the game with
probability at most 3/4 [2].
Multipartite entangled states are a fundamental re-
source when quantum networks are considered. Indeed,
they allow network agents to create strong correlations
in order to perform distributed tasks, to delegate com-
putation to untrusted servers [3], or to compute, for ex-
ample through the Measurement-Based Quantum Com-
putation model [4]. A natural and fundamental question
that arises then is whether the network agents should be
required to trust the source that provides them with such
multipartite entangled states or whether they are able to
verify the entanglement.
In this work, we show that a quantum agent can verify
efficiently with respect to the necessary resources, that
an untrusted source creates entanglement, even in the
presence of dishonest parties.
The model – We start our analysis by first describing
in detail our model and its relation to previous work.
Source: The source is untrusted. It is supposed to
create the n-party GHZ state 1√
2n
(|0n〉 + |1n〉) and dis-
tribute it to n parties. By applying a Hadamard and a
phase shift (
√
Z) gate to each qubit, the GHZ state can
be expressed by the locally equivalent state
|Φn0 〉 =
1√
2n−1
[ ∑
∆(y)≡0 (mod 4)
|y〉 −
∑
∆(y)≡2 (mod 4)
|y〉
]
,
where y is a classical n-bit string y1...yn and ∆(y) =∑
i yi denotes the Hamming weight of y. We will use the
latter state for our proofs. Such states have a wide range
of applications, for example in nonlocal games, quantum
game theory and quantum computation.
Parties: A party can be honest or dishonest. An hon-
est party does not know which parties are honest and
which are dishonest. The dishonest parties can collabo-
rate with each other and control the source. Their goal is
to convince the honest parties that the source can create
the n-party GHZ state, while in reality this may not be
true. They are allowed to create a different state every
time or entangle the state with any auxiliary space.
Local resources: A party has a trusted single-qubit
measurement device with two measurement settings and
a trusted classical random source.
Network resources: Every pair of parties shares a pri-
vate classical channel, in other words, the communication
between two honest parties remains secret. This is the
standard setup for classical networks with dishonest par-
ties, since in the absence of private channels we cannot
guarantee security for more than a single honest party.
Note that we want to use the least possible resources
for our protocol. Indeed, we only need each party to
be able to produce randomness, to perform single-qubit
measurements and to securely communicate classical in-
formation with the other parties. Since our goal is to con-
struct protocols that can be widely available in the near
2future, it is imperative to minimize the resources avail-
able to the agents, especially the quantum resources that
are considered more expensive than the classical ones,
hence bringing such tasks closer to reality.
Related work – Most of the work on entanglement
verification has considered the case where all parties are
honest. For two parties, three models have been studied.
First, the standard model, where both parties trust
their devices but they do not trust the source. This
model corresponds to the setting of non-separability
tests, where the two parties can perform together quan-
tum tomography on the state distributed by the source
and thus verify the existence of entanglement. In a cryp-
tographic language, this corresponds to a setting where
all parties are guaranteed to be honest. A related ques-
tion concerning untrusted sources in quantum key distri-
bution protocols is discussed in [5].
Second, the device independent model, where the par-
ties trust neither their quantum devices nor the source.
This model is related to the well known setting of the
Bell nonlocality tests as well as to self-testing [6].
Third, the one-sided device independent model [7],
where the security is asymmetric: one party trusts his
devices but the second party’s devices and the source are
untrusted. This model corresponds to the setting of gen-
eralized quantum steering [8, 9], where one party is also
given control of the source and tries to convince the other
party, who trusts his devices, that she can create entan-
glement. In a cryptographic language, an honest party
tries to verify entanglement in the presence of a dishon-
est party who controls the source. Recently, there have
been experimental demonstrations in this model [10–12].
For the multipartite case, much less is known. In the
standard model, pseudo-telepathy [13] extends Mermin’s
game [2] to many parties; a maximally entangled state
is used to play the game and wins with probability one,
which is strictly better than in the classical case. In the
device independent model, it was shown that honest par-
ties who do not trust their devices can verify genuine
multipartite entanglement by using appropriate entangle-
ment witnesses [14]. Finally, in [15] the authors present
a unified framework for n-party entanglement verifica-
tion and provide inequalities with different bounds for
the different nonlocality classes that are considered.
Our Work – In our model, there are, in general, k
honest parties and n−k dishonest parties who control the
source, which is supposed to create an n-party GHZ state.
Each honest party does not know which other parties are
honest. Our goal is to provide an efficient test for an
honest party, such that the test passes only if the state
produced by the source creates entanglement between all
k honest parties and the n− k dishonest parties.
First, if all players are honest, we prove that any n-
party state that is ǫ-away from the n-party GHZ state
passes the test with probability at most 1 − ǫ2/2. Sec-
ond, in the presence of any number of dishonest parties,
we prove a similar quantitative statement, this time for
any n-party state that is ǫ-away from the n-party GHZ
state up to a local unitary operation on the space of the
dishonest parties.
For the special case of n = 2, our model significantly
extends the results in the generalized quantum steering
setting by providing a tight analysis of the tradeoff be-
tween the distance of the shared state to the n-party GHZ
and the probability of success of the test. For the case
of n = k, i.e. the standard model, our results again pro-
vide a tight analysis of the tradeoff between the distance
and the probability the test passes. For general n parties
and k honest ones, this is the first rigorous analysis of an
entanglement verification test.
The Protocol V – Consider a source that is supposed
to create and distribute the state |Φn0 〉 to n parties. We
present a verification protocol V that one party, called
the Verifier, can run with the other n − 1 parties, in
order to verify that the state |Ψ〉 created by the source
is in fact the correct one.
1. The Verifier selects for each i ∈ [n] a random input
Xi ∈ {0, 1}, such that
∑n
i=1Xi ≡ 0 (mod 2), and
sends it to the corresponding party via a private
classical channel.
2. If Xi = 0, party i performs a Z operation.
If Xi = 1, party i performs a Hadamard operation.
3. Party i measures in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis and sends
the corresponding outcome Yi ∈ {0, 1} to the Veri-
fier via the private channel.
4. The Verifier accepts the result if and only if:
n∑
i=1
Yi ≡ 1
2
n∑
i=1
Xi (mod 2)
The above protocol assumes that a specific party plays
the role of the Verifier. We will later address the question
of how to pick such a Verifier among all honest parties.
Note that this test has been used before [13], however
our analysis is entirely different. We denote by T (|Ψ〉)
the event that the Verifier accepts the result of the Test,
when the joint state is |Ψ〉.
Correctness of the protocol – We want to show
that the state |Φn0 〉 passes the Test with probability 1.
We need to define the following state:
|Φn1 〉 =
1√
2n−1
[ ∑
∆(y)≡1 (mod 4)
|y〉 −
∑
∆(y)≡3 (mod 4)
|y〉
]
It is easily verifiable (from the definition of the states)
that for any k and n:
|Φn0 〉 =
1√
2
[
|Φk0〉|Φn−k0 〉 − |Φk1〉|Φn−k1 〉
]
(1)
From condition
∑n
i=1Xi ≡ 0 (mod 2), we have two
cases:
3• (12
∑n
i=1Xi) ≡ 0 (mod 2): This means that the
sum of the inputs is a multiple of 4. Using Eq. (1),
it can be proven that the state |Φn0 〉 goes to ±|Φn0 〉
when we apply to it an operator consisting of a 0
(mod 4) number of single-qubit Hadamards, and Z
gates on the remaining qubits. Hence we always
have
∑n
i=1 Yi ≡ 0 (mod 2).
• (12
∑n
i=1Xi) ≡ 1(mod 2): This means that the sum
of the inputs is even but not a multiple of 4. Again,
it can be proven that the state |Φn0 〉 goes to ±|Φn1 〉
when we apply to it an operator consisting of a 2
(mod 4) number of single-qubit Hadamards, and Z
gates on the remaining qubits. Hence we always
have
∑n
i=1 Yi ≡ 1 (mod 2).
Security in the Honest Model – We now look at
the model where all n parties are honest and analyze the
probability that our Test accepts a state as a function of
the distance of this state to |Φn0 〉. We first analyze the
case of a pure state. Denoting by D(|ψ〉, |φ〉) the trace
distance between two states |ψ〉 and |φ〉, we have
Theorem 1. If D(|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = ǫ, Pr[T (|Ψ〉)] ≤ 1− ǫ
2
2 .
The main idea of the proof is to show that our Test is
equivalent to performing a POVM {Pn, I − Pn} (where
the first outcome corresponds to acceptance) with
Pn = |Φn0 〉〈Φn0 |+
1
2
ISn ,
where Sn denotes the subspace of n-qubit states that
are orthogonal to both |Φn0 〉 and |Φn1 〉, and ISn denotes
the projection on this subspace. In other words, we
show that the state |Φn0 〉 passes the Test with proba-
bility 1, the state |Φn1 〉 passes the Test with probability
0 and all other states in the orthogonal subspace pass
the Test with probability exactly 1/2. The proof of this
statement is in fact quite involved and is done by in-
duction on the dimension of the state (see Appendix
for details). With this characterization for our Test,
we express any state |Ψ〉 such that D(|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = ǫ
as |Ψ〉 = √1− ǫ2|Φn0 〉 +
∑2n−1
i=1 ǫi|Φni 〉, where for i ≥
2, |Φni 〉 ∈ Sn and
∑2n−1
i=1 ǫ
2
i = ǫ
2, and hence we have
Pr[T (|Ψ〉)] = tr(Pn|Ψ〉) ≤ 1− ǫ22 .
Note that for a mixed state ρ = {pi, |Ψi〉}, Pr[T (ρ)] =∑
i pi Pr[T (|Ψi〉)]. Then, by convexity we have
Corollary 1. If D(ρ, |Φn0 〉) = ǫ, Pr[T (ρ)] ≤ 1− ǫ
2
2 .
Security in the Dishonest Model – We look now at
the model where the honest Verifier runs the test in the
presence of dishonest parties. The Verifier is considered
to be known to all parties. We prove in this case a the-
orem similar to the case of all honest parties. It should
be clear here that there is no way for the honest parties
to determine whether the dishonest parties act as n− k
independent parties each holding one qubit or whether
they have colluded to one party. For example, the state
|Φk+10 〉 = 1√2
[
|Φk0〉|0〉 − |Φk1〉|1〉
]
, where the n − k dis-
honest parties hold a single qubit, passes the Test with
probability 1, since the dishonest parties can locally map
this state to |Φn0 〉. Hence, the correct security statement
must take into account the fact that the dishonest parties
may apply some operator on their space.
Theorem 2. Let |Ψ〉 be the state of all n parties. If
ǫ = minU D(U |Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉), where U is an operator on the
space of the dishonest parties, then Pr[T (|Ψ〉] ≤ 1− ǫ24 .
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the
n parties share a state of the form |Ψ〉 = |Φk0〉|Ψ0〉 +
|Φk1〉|Ψ1〉+|X 〉, where in |X 〉 the component of the honest
parties is orthogonal to |Φk0〉 and |Φk1〉, and the dishonest
state is not normalized. For the dishonest parties, mak-
ing the Verifier accept the Test is equivalent to guessing
the honest output YH :=
∑
H Yi (mod 2), where H is the
set of the honest parties, before announcing their mea-
surement outcomes. The optimal probability of guessing
YH given XH :=
∑
H Xi (mod 2) is given by the Hel-
strom measurement. Let p = ‖|Ψ0〉‖2, q = ‖|Ψ1〉‖2 and
〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉2 = pq cos2 θ, where θ is the angle between |Ψ0〉
and |Ψ1〉. Then, we calculate that:
Pr[guess YH ] ≤ 1− 1
4
(
1− (p+ q)
2 + 4pq sin2 θ
2
)
.
We consider now that the dishonest parties can per-
form a local operation on their state, in order to maxi-
mize their cheating probability. Thus, the distance of the
dishonest state from the correct one is : ǫ = minUD((I⊗
U)|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = minU
√
1− F 2((I ⊗ U)|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉), where
by F (|ψ〉, |φ〉) we denote the fidelity between two states
|ψ〉 and |φ〉. If the reduced density matrices of the honest
players of the perfect and the real state are σH and ρH
respectively, it holds that there exists a local operation
R on the dishonest state such that:
F ((I ⊗R)|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = F (σH , ρH) =
p+ q + 2
√
pqsinθ
2
For this operation R, the distance becomes:
ǫ2 ≤ 1− F 2((I ⊗R)|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = 1− F 2(σH , ρH),
which concludes the proof (see Appendix for more de-
tails).
Security for all honest parties – We have presented
a protocol that a Verifier can use to verify the state of
an untrusted source in the presence of dishonest parties
with minimal resources. Our protocol can be useful in
the scenario where some party wants to perform a com-
plex quantum computation and needs to delegate parts of
the computation to other parties, who, of course, would
need some source of multipartite entanglement in order
4to perform the joint computation. Note that the Verifier
can repeat the protocol sequentially in order to increase
the probability of detecting an erroneous state.
In a more general scenario, however, where parties
need to perform securely some distributed multipartite
computation using the multipartite entangled state as an
initial shared resource, we need to guarantee security for
all honest parties at the same time. In other words, we
would like a protocol that guarantees to all honest parties
that they will only accept to use a state for the computa-
tion that comes from a source that produces states that
are very close to an n-party GHZ state. A priori, such
a task is impossible, since any such protocol could be
used to produce unbiased strong coins [16] (the parties
could just measure the entangled state to produce coins).
Hence, we need to provide some additional resource.
Trusted Common Random Source (CRS): We assume
that all parties have access to a trusted classical random
source that provides them with the same randomness.
This is, of course, a powerful, but necessary, resource.
One way to achieve it would be to assume that at least a
third of all parties are honest, since this implies the abil-
ity to securely produce random bits only with authenti-
cated classical communication [17]. Note that in order to
achieve quantum secure multiparty computation, at least
a majority of honest parties is required [18], in which case
it is possible to construct a CRS.
We describe how to repeat our verification test in order
to guarantee the following: when the parties decide to use
the state for computation, then the probability that the
state produced by the source is ǫ-away from the n-party
GHZ state goes to zero exponentially fast with the num-
ber of repetitions. Note that our guarantee is on the state
produced by the source. Of course, we cannot prevent
the dishonest parties from destroying the entanglement
with the honest parties just before using this state for
further computation. However, we argue that our test
is still useful for secure multiparty computation. First,
as we noted before, if the goal of the dishonest parties is
to convince the honest parties of the source’s ability to
create entanglement, destroying the entanglement after
the source has produced it does not help them. Second,
in general, in secure multiparty computation, one of the
main goals is to guarantee that the inputs of the honest
parties remain secret for the dishonest parties. Since in
our model the parties will only perform local quantum
operations (if the parties could send their qubits to other
parties then checking the source will be much easier by
having all qubits sent to the verifier), by destroying the
entanglement, the dishonest parties cannot increase their
information about the honest parties’ inputs. Third, we
still have a strong guarantee on the honest players’ states
from which they can, for example, extract correlated se-
cret bits.
Let S be a security parameter.
The Symmetric Protocol
1. The source distributes a state |Ψ〉 to the n parties
(the honest source distributes the state |Φn0 〉).
2. Parties receive r ∈ {0, 1}S and i ∈ [n] from CRS.
(a) If r = 0, the state |Ψ〉 is used for computation.
(b) If r 6= 0, Party i runs Protocol V with |Ψ〉. If
he rejects, then abort, otherwise go to Step 1.
Note that the source may create a different state at ev-
ery repetition of the protocol. It is also important that
the state is distributed before the parties receive the ran-
domness from the CRS. Let Cǫ be the event that the
symmetric protocol has not aborted and that the state
used for the computation, which we denote by |Ψ〉, is
such that minU D(U |Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) ≥ ǫ, where U is an opera-
tor on the space of the dishonest parties. We will prove
the following:
Theorem 3. For all ǫ > 0, Pr[Cǫ] ≤ 2−S 4nkǫ2 .
The proof is given in the Appendix. When the Verifier
is dishonest we suppose that the state always passes the
test. By choosing S = log 4nδǫ2 for some constant δ > 0,
all honest parties have the guarantee that the probabil-
ity the state used has distance at least ǫ from the correct
one, is at most 1/δ. Note that the expected number of
repetitions of the protocol is 2S , which, with our choice
of S, is polynomial in n and 1/ǫ (and with probability ex-
ponentially close to 1 the number of repetitions is at most
O(2S)). Moreover, this protocol provides guarantees to
all honest parties, unlike the case of quantum steering
and our multipartite generalization. To this end, it was
necessary to make the assumption of a trusted classical
random source.
Discussion – It is important to note that our analysis
does not take into account losses and noise that appear
in a realistic setting. It will be interesting to study such
conditions, as was recently done for bipartite quantum
steering [10]. We also note that although our results pro-
vide a verification test for the GHZ state, the analysis
should in principle be applicable to all states for which a
Bell-type test is available, such as stabilizer states.
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APPENDIX
Security in the Honest Model
We look first at the model where all n parties are hon-
est and analyze the probability that our Test accepts a
state as a function of the distance of this state to |Φn0 〉.
We first analyze the case of a pure state. Denoting by
D(|ψ〉, |φ〉) the trace distance between two states |ψ〉 and
|φ〉, we have
Theorem 1. If D(|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = ǫ, Pr[T (|Ψ〉)] ≤ 1− ǫ
2
2 .
Proof. Let X1 and Y1 be the input and output of party
1, respectively. For
∑n
i=1Xi ≡ 0 (mod 2) and randomly
chosen inputs, we have the following cases:
1. X1 = 0 and Y1 = 0, the test passes if∑n
i=2 Yi ≡
{
0 (mod 2) when
∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 0 (mod 4)
1 (mod 2) when
∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 2 (mod 4)
2. X1 = 0 and Y1 = 1, the test passes if∑n
i=2 Yi ≡
{
1 (mod 2) when
∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 0 (mod 4)
0 (mod 2) when
∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 2 (mod 4)
3. X1 = 1 and Y1 = 1, the test passes if∑n
i=2 Yi ≡
{
0 (mod 2) when
∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 1 (mod 4)
1 (mod 2) when
∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 3 (mod 4)
4. X1 = 1 and Y1 = 0, the test passes if∑n
i=2 Yi ≡
{
1 (mod 2) when
∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 1 (mod 4)
0 (mod 2) when
∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 3 (mod 4)
We can consider the above tests on the n − 1 parties
as projective measurements for different inputs. When∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 0 (mod 2), the n−1 parties perform a POVM
{Pn−1, I − Pn−1}, where the first outcome corresponds
to case 1 and the second to case 2. When
∑n
i=2Xi ≡ 1
(mod 2), the test is equivalent to performing a POVM
{Qn−1, I − Qn−1}, where the first outcome corresponds
to case 3 and the second to case 4.
Let Sn the subspace of quantum pure states of n qubits
that are orthogonal to both |Φn0 〉 and |Φn1 〉, and let ISn the
projection on this subspace. We will prove by induction
that:
Pn = |Φn0 〉〈Φn0 |+
1
2
ISn , Qn = |Φn+〉〈Φn+|+
1
2
ISn
For n = 1, Sn is the empty subspace, P1 = |0〉〈0| and
Q1 = |+〉〈+|, so the statements hold. We now suppose
the statements are true for n − 1 parties with n ≥ 2
and we prove it for n parties. Since the choice of X1 is
uniformly random, we have
Pn =
1
2
(|0〉〈0| ⊗ Pn−1 + |1〉〈1| ⊗ (I − Pn−1))
+
1
2
(|+〉〈+| ⊗ (I −Qn−1) + |−〉〈−| ⊗Qn−1)
We now use the induction property. Notice that
(I − Pn−1) = |Φn−11 〉〈Φn−11 | + 12ISn−1 and (I −Qn−1) =
|Φn−1− 〉〈Φn−1− |+ 12ISn−1 . Then,
Pn =
1
2
(|0〉〈0| ⊗ |Φn−10 〉〈Φn−10 |+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |Φn−11 〉〈Φn−11 |
+ |+〉〈+| ⊗ |Φn−1− 〉〈Φn−1− |+ |−〉〈−| ⊗ |Φn−1+ 〉〈Φn−1+ |
+ I1 ⊗ ISn−1
)
,
where I1 is the identity operator on one qubit.
Using |Φn−1− 〉〈Φn−1− |+|Φn−1+ 〉〈Φn−1+ | = |Φn−10 〉〈Φn−10 |+
|Φn−11 〉〈Φn−11 | and |Φn−1− 〉〈Φn−1− | − |Φn−1+ 〉〈Φn−1+ | =
−|Φn−10 〉〈Φn−11 | − |Φn−11 〉〈Φn−10 |, we have:
Pn = |0〉〈0|
(3
4
|Φn−10 〉〈Φn−10 |+
1
4
|Φn−11 〉〈Φn−11 |
)
− |0〉〈1|
(1
4
|Φn−10 〉〈Φn−11 |+
1
4
|Φn−11 〉〈Φn−10 |
)
− |1〉〈0|
(1
4
|Φn−10 〉〈Φn−11 |+
1
4
|Φn−11 〉〈Φn−10 |
)
+ |1〉〈1|
(1
4
|Φn−10 〉〈Φn−10 |+
3
4
|Φn−11 〉〈Φn−11 |
)
+
1
2
I1 ⊗ ISn−1
6Note that
|Φn0 〉 =
1√
2
|0〉|Φn−10 〉 −
1√
2
|1〉|Φn−11 〉
|Φn1 〉 =
1√
2
|0〉|Φn−11 〉+
1√
2
|1〉|Φn−10 〉
and define
|Ψn0 〉 =
1√
2
|0〉|Φn−10 〉+
1√
2
|1〉|Φn−11 〉
|Ψn1 〉 =
1√
2
|0〉|Φn−11 〉 −
1√
2
|1〉|Φn−10 〉
After some simple calculations, we have
Pn = |Φn0 〉〈Φn0 |+
1
2
|Ψn0 〉〈Ψn0 |+
1
2
|Ψn1 〉〈Ψn1 |+
1
2
I1 ⊗ ISn−1
Note also that
ISn = I1 ⊗ ISn−1 + |Ψn0 〉〈Ψn0 |+ |Ψn1 〉〈Ψn1 |,
which concludes the proof for Pn. To complete the
induction, we can show in a similar way that Qn =
|Φn+〉〈Φn+|+ 12ISn .
Assume now that the n honest parties share a state |Ψ〉
with D(|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = ǫ. We can express |Ψ〉 as follows:
|Ψ〉 =
√
1− ǫ2|Φn0 〉+
2n−1∑
i=1
ǫi|Φni 〉,
where for i ≥ 2, |Φni 〉 ∈ Sn and
∑2n−1
i=1 ǫ
2
i = ǫ. The
state |Ψ〉 verifies the Test in the protocol with probability
tr(Pn|Ψ〉), so we have:
Pr[T (|Ψ〉)] = 1− ǫ2 +
∑2n−1
i=2 ǫ
2
2
≤ 1− ǫ2 + ǫ
2
2
= 1− ǫ
2
2
Security in the Dishonest Model
We look now at the model where the honest Verifier
runs the test in the presence of dishonest parties. The
Verifier is considered to be known to all parties. Let us
assume that there is a set H of k honest parties (the
number and identity of all but himself are unknown to
the Verifier) and a set D of n− k dishonest parties that
collaborate with the quantum source. The goal of the dis-
honest parties is to convince the Verifier that the source
can create the n-party GHZ state, while this may not be
true.
Let XD :=
∑
DXi (mod 2), YD :=
∑
D Yi (mod 2)
denote the parity of the inputs and outputs of the dis-
honest parties, respectively (similarly for XH , YH for the
honest parties). Since the Verifier picks the inputs for
all parties at random, we can describe the two equally
probable Tests that the k honest parties perform with
the POVMs {Pk, I −Pk} and {Qk, I −Qk}, as they were
defined before.
More precisely, if XD = 0 then the Test corresponds to
the POVM {Pk, I −Pk}, where the accepting outcome is
Pk when YD ≡ 12
∑
DXi (mod 2) and I−Pk when YD 6≡
1
2
∑
DXi (mod 2). If XD = 1 then the Test corresponds
to the POVM {Qk, I−Qk}, where the accepting outcome
is Qk when YD ≡ 12 (−1 +
∑
DXi) (mod 2) and I − Qk
when YD 6≡ 12 (−1 +
∑
DXi) (mod 2).
We prove a theorem similar to the case of all honest
parties. It should be clear that there is no way for the
honest parties to determine whether the dishonest parties
act as n− k independent parties each holding one qubit
or whether they have colluded to one party. For example,
the state |Φk+10 〉 = 1√2
[
|Φk0〉|0〉−|Φk1〉|1〉
]
, where the n−k
dishonest parties hold a single qubit, passes the Test with
probability 1, since the dishonest parties can locally map
this state to |Φn0 〉. Hence, the correct security statement
must take into account the fact that the dishonest parties
may apply some operator on their space.
Theorem 2. Let |Ψ〉 be the state of all n parties. If
ǫ = minU D(U |Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉), where U is an operator on the
space of the dishonest parties, then Pr[T (|Ψ〉] ≤ 1− ǫ24 .
Proof. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the
n parties share a state of the form
|Ψ〉 = |Φk0〉|Ψ0〉+ |Φk1〉|Ψ1〉+ |X 〉, (2)
where the honest part of state |X 〉 is orthogonal to both
|Φk0〉 and |Φk1〉 and the dishonest state is not supposed
to be normalized. For the dishonest parties, making
the Verifier accept the Test is equivalent to guessing the
honest output YH before announcing their measurement
outcomes YD. The Helstrom measurement can provide
the best guess for YH by distinguishing the dishonest
states for the honest output YH = 0 and YH = 1. Let
ρn−k = trk|X 〉〈X | be the (unnormalized) reduced den-
sity operator when the honest parties are traced out of
the state |X 〉. Recall that Pk = |Φk0〉〈Φk0 |+ 12ISk . Hence,
for XH = 0 we have :
Pr[guess YH |XH = 0]
=
1
2
+
1
2
∥∥∥trk[Pk ⊗ In−k|Ψ〉 − (I − Pk)⊗ In−k|Ψ〉]
∥∥∥
=
1
2
+
1
2
∥∥∥|Ψ0〉〈Ψ0|+ 1
2
ρn−k −
(
|Ψ1〉〈Ψ1|+ 1
2
ρn−k
)∥∥∥
=
1
2
+
1
2
∥∥∥|Ψ0〉〈Ψ0| − |Ψ1〉〈Ψ1|
∥∥∥
=
1
2
+
1
2
√(∥∥|Ψ0〉∥∥2 + ∥∥|Ψ1〉∥∥2)2 − 4〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉2
where we calculated the trace norm as the sum of the ab-
solute values of the eigenvalues of the matrix. Similarly,
7we can calculate that:
Pr[guess YH |XH = 1]
=
1
2
+
1
2
√(∥∥|Ψ+〉∥∥2 + ∥∥|Ψ−〉∥∥2)2 − 4〈Ψ+|Ψ−〉2
We define p = ‖|Ψ0〉‖2 and q = ‖|Ψ1〉‖2. Let
also θ be the angle between |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 such
that 〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉2 = pq cos2 θ. We have 〈Ψ+|Ψ−〉2 =
1/4
(∥∥|Ψ0〉∥∥2−∥∥|Ψ1〉∥∥2)2 = (p−q)2/4.We also know that
‖|Ψ+〉‖2 + ‖|Ψ−〉‖2 = ‖|Ψ0〉‖2 + ‖|Ψ1〉‖2 = p + q ≤ 1.
Since the value of XH is random, we have:
Pr[T (|Ψ〉)] =
=
1
2
(
Pr[guess YH |XH = 0] + Pr[guess YH |XH = 1]
)
=
1
2
+
1
4
(√
(p+ q)2 − 4pqcos2θ +
√
(p+ q)2 − (p− q)2
)
=
1
2
+
1
4
(√
(p+ q)2 − 4pqcos2θ + 2√pq
)
≤ 1
2
+
1
4
( (p+ q)2 − 4pqcos2θ + 1 + 4pq + 1
2
)
=
1
2
+
1
4
( (p+ q)2 + 4pqsin2θ + 2
2
)
= 1− 1
4
(
1− (p+ q)
2 + 4pqsin2θ
2
)
(3)
We consider now that the dishonest parties can perform
a local operation on their state, in order to maximize
their cheating probability. Thus, the distance of the dis-
honest state from the correct one is : ǫ = minUD((I ⊗
U)|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = minU
√
1− F 2((I ⊗ U)|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉), where
by F (|ψ〉, |φ〉) we denote the fidelity between two states
|ψ〉 and |φ〉. If the reduced density matrices of the honest
players of the perfect and the real state are σH and ρH
respectively, it holds that there exists a local operation
R on the dishonest state such that:
F ((I ⊗R)|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = F (σH , ρH)
By considering this operation R, the distance becomes:
ǫ2 ≤ 1− F 2((I ⊗R)|Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = 1− F 2(σH , ρH)
We have:
σH =
1
2
(|Φk0〉〈Φk0 |+ |Φk1〉〈Φk1 |)
ρH =
p|Φk0〉〈Φk0 |+ q|Φk1〉〈Φk1 |+
√
pq cos θ
(|Φk0〉〈Φk1 |+ |Φk1〉〈Φk0 |)
+ (additional terms that include |X 〉)
F 2(σH , ρH) = tr
2(
√
σ
1/2
H ρHσ
1/2
H )
= tr2
(
√√√√√√√√
1
2


p
√
pq cos θ 0 . . . 0√
pq cos θ q 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
... . . .
...


)
Then, we diagonalize the matrix keeping only the upper
left non-zero part for simplicity. The determinant of the
characteristic function is:
det(tI −A) = det
[
t− p √pq cos θ√
pq cos θ t− q
]
= (t− p)(t− q)− pq cos2 θ
= t2 − t(p+ q) + pq sin2 θ
Hence, the two eigenvalues of the matrix are:
t1,2 =
p+ q ±
√
(p+ q)2 − 4pqsin2θ
2
We then have:
F 2(σH , ρH) =
1
4
(√
p+ q +
√
(p+ q)2 − 4pqsin2θ
+
√
p+ q −
√
(p+ q)2 − 4pqsin2θ
)2
=
1
4
(
2p+ 2q + 2
√
(p+ q +
√
(p+ q)2 − 4pqsin2θ)
·
√
(p+ q −
√
(p+ q)2 − 4pqsin2θ)
)
=
1
2
(
p+ q +
√
(p+ q)2 − (p+ q)2 + 4pqsin2θ)
=
1
2
(
p+ q + 2sinθ
√
pq
)
,
which gives
ǫ2 ≤ 1− p+ q
2
−√pq sin(θ)
Recall that from Eq. (3) we have:
Pr[T (|Ψ〉)] = 1− 1
4
(
1− (p+ q)
2 + 4pqsin2θ
2
)
We use the fact that (p+q)2 ≤ (p+q) since p+q ≤ 1. Sim-
ilarly, we use 4pq sin2 θ ≤ 2√pq sin θ since 2√pq sin θ ≤ 1.
From this, we conclude that:
Pr[T (|Ψ〉)] = 1− 1
4
(
1− (p+ q)
2 + 4pqsin2θ
2
)
≤ 1− 1
4
(
1− p+ q
2
− sinθ√pq
)
≤ 1− ǫ
2
4
Security for all honest parties
Let Cǫ be the event that the state used for the
computation, which we denote by |Ψ〉, is such that
minU D(U |Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) ≥ ǫ, where U is an operator on the
space of the dishonest parties. We prove the following:
Theorem 3. For all ǫ > 0, Pr[Cǫ] ≤ 2−S 4nkǫ2 .
8Proof. It is not hard to see that the optimal dishonest
strategy that maximizes the probability of Cǫ is to create
at all repetitions of the protocol a state |Ψ〉 such that
minU D(U |Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) = ǫ. In fact, if the source creates a
state with smaller distance, then this does not contribute
to the probability of event Cǫ; if the source creates a
state with distance larger than ǫ, then this increases the
chances of unsuccessful cheating if the state is tested,
hence decreasing the probability Cǫ.
Let Clǫ be the event that the state is used for the com-
putation at the l-th repetition of the protocol and is such
that minU D(U |Ψ〉, |Φn0 〉) ≥ ǫ. This implies that in all
previous repetitions the states have been tested success-
fully. We define the following probabilities:
P1= Probability that the parties receive r = 0..0 from
the CRS, which means that they use the state. This
probability is equal to 2−S .
P2= Probability Party i, who becomes the Verifier, is
honest. This probability is equal to k/n.
Let us also define as VH: the event that the Verifier is
Honest and as VD: the event that the verifier is dishonest.
Note that for all states, Pr[T (|Ψ〉)|VD] = 1. Then,
Pr[Clǫ] = P1(1− P1)l−1
(
1− P2 + P2 · Pr[T (|Ψ〉)|VH]
)l−1
≤ 2−S(1− 2−S)l−1
(n− k
n
+
k
n
(
1− ǫ
2
4
))l−1
= 2−S(1− 2−S)l−1
(
1− kǫ
2
4n
)l−1
The infinite integral on l provides an upper bound on the
total probability Cǫ. We have
Pr[Cǫ] ≤
∫ ∞
0
2−S(1 − 2−S)l
(
1− kǫ
2
4n
)l
dl
≤ 2−S
∫ ∞
0
(
1− kǫ
2
4n
)l
dl
= 2−S
−1
log(1 − kǫ24n )
≤ 2−S 4n
kǫ2
